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Joined 4 months ago
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Cake day: April 7th, 2026

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  • You’re interacting with a server managed by someone else - everything that flows through it is ultimately under their control, and you’re trusting them with it. They could log everything, or nothing. Even if storing passwords hashed is the default, an admin can replace any part of the code they want, so they could grab and store raw passwords if they really wanted to, or take over your account and impersonate you, or any number of other unlikely but possible things.

    So use a unique password, and only provide data (your real source ip, your saved posts, views, votes, etc) that you trust the admins of your server with.


  • 35-50mph is motorcycle territory, and you should get a motorcycle helmet (Snell-rated are the most safe, DOT-rated are less safe, anything unrated is trash). Helmets are the one piece of gear I take seriously, so here’s my spiel:

    For a motorcycle helmet to work properly, you really need it to fit properly, and the only way to tell is to put it on and test it out. If it’s too loose, too tight, slightly wrong shape for your head, etc, that could negate most of the protection the helmet offers.

    I urge you to make that trip to a shop that sells helmets and get a proper fit. Or at least order several models and sizes from the links others have posted and return anything that doesn’t fit perfectly.

    I had a very dainty motorcycle crash in the rain once at no more than 10mph, and still ended up with a concussion because my helmet wasn’t the right fit. Made me realize how easily I could have died if I’d had a different crash, since I’d been relying on a helmet that was never going to protect me properly in the first place.


  • This is a week-old repo with a 163,000-line initial commit, and the test repo that init was dumped in from is filled with hundreds of claude/codex co-author commits. Regardless of whether it’s to hide the ai co-authoring, it’s shady to obscure a repo’s initial work like that.

    I could be wrong, of course, but this smells like yet another overambitious ai-slop project that’ll get abandoned in a month.








  • I run the immich container stack on a vm with 4GiB memory and 2 cores, with db on local disk and external libraries over smb, and it runs perfectly fine. I offload the machine learning jobs to another sometimes-on machine, sometimes, but don’t really need to unless I’m dumping thousands of new images into the external library at a time and want it all to process quickly.


  • Looks like both of your vms probably have the same mac address - the 172 ip address is likely a self-assigned fallback when the dhcp server replies to the second vm that it can’t give it an address. Double-check and make sure the mac address in each vm’s proxmox network adapter settings match your pfsense dhcp reservations, and let me know if that resolves it.






  • mlfh@lm.mlfh.orgtoWikipedia@lemmy.worldSunland Baobab
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    2 months ago

    According to a study published in 2018, not only the Sunland Baobab, but “the majority of the oldest and largest African baobabs [have died] over the past 12 years”.

    Trees that have survived for over a thousand years, all dying together within the span of 12.


  • From the grapheneos faq section on device support, which details the kinds of hardware and firmware security features required and present on pixels (but may be missing on other devices):

    Hardware, firmware and software specific to devices like drivers play a huge role in the overall security of a device. The goal of the project is not to slightly improve some aspects of insecure devices and supporting a broad set of devices would be directly counter to the values of the project. A lot of the low-level work also ends up being fairly tied to the hardware.
    Non-exhaustive list of requirements for future devices, which are standards met or exceeded by current Pixel devices:

    • Support for using alternate operating systems including full hardware security functionality
    • Complete monthly Android Security Bulletin patches without any regular delays longer than a week for device support code (firmware, drivers and HALs)
    • At least 5 years of updates from launch for device support code with phones (Pixels now have 7) and 7 years with tablets
    • Device support code updated to new monthly, quarterly and yearly releases of AOSP within several months to provide new security improvements (Pixels receive these in the month they’re released)
    • Linux 6.1, 6.6 or 6.12 Generic Kernel Image (GKI) support
    • Hardware accelerated virtualization usable by GrapheneOS (ideally pKVM to match Pixels but another usable implementation may be acceptable)
    • Hardware memory tagging (ARM MTE or equivalent)
    • Hardware-based coarse grained Control Flow Integrity (CFI) for baseline coverage where type-based CFI isn’t used or can’t be deployed (BTI/PAC, CET IBT or equivalent)
    • PXN, SMEP or equivalent
    • PAN, SMAP or equivalent
    • Isolated radios (cellular, Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, NFC, etc.), GPU, SSD, media encode and decode, image processor and other components
    • Support for A/B updates of both the firmware and OS images with automatic rollback if the initial boot fails one or more times
    • Verified boot with rollback protection for firmware
    • Verified boot with rollback protection for the OS (Android Verified Boot)
    • Verified boot key fingerprint for yellow boot state displayed with a secure hash (non-truncated SHA-256 or better)
    • StrongBox keystore provided by secure element
    • Hardware key attestation support for the StrongBox keystore
    • Attest key support for hardware key attestation to provide pinning support
    • Weaver disk encryption key derivation throttling provided by secure element
    • Insider attack resistance for updates to the secure element (Owner user authentication required before updates are accepted)
    • Inline disk encryption acceleration with wrapped key support
    • 64-bit-only device support code
    • Wi-Fi anonymity support including MAC address randomization, probe sequence number randomization and no other leaked identifiers
    • Support for disabling USB data and also USB as a whole at a hardware level in the USB controller
    • Reset attack mitigation for firmware-based boot modes such as fastboot mode zeroing memory left over from the OS and delaying opening up attack surface such as USB functionality until that’s completed
    • Debugging features such as JTAG or serial debugging must be inaccessible while the device is locked